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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper has the purpose to analyze most recent 
economic and political changes in the Mexican States, 
which show a clear transitional tendency from an 
entrepreneurial state toward a state of entrepreneurs 
through the following stages: The PRI-presidential 
Mexican Entrepreneurial State with an emphasis in the 
welfare state model, followed by a period marked by the 
transition of the Mexican State focused on a neoliberal 
PRI-presidential reinventing of the state, as the result of 
the economic and political impact of globalization and its 
pervasive effects on an unequal income distribution, weak 
governance, political instability  and lack of property 
security, besides a new relation’s interface between 
government and enterprises. Finally, the regime’s 
transition under the change of party in power opens the 
stage of a Mexican State of Entrepreneurs in the new 
period PAN-presidential. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mexico is a country highly centralized with a powerful 
government, no reelection and until recently, strong and 
open political competition. Since the independence of 
Mexico and for the last two Centuries, the dominant 
political system has been authoritarian and presidential 
oriented. Starting with the emerging governments from the 
Mexican Revolution  (1910-17), it settles a dominant 
party’s dictatorship that monopolizes political 
representation and a deforming presidencialism, that 
Krauze has denominated the Imperial Presidency, which 
weaknesses faculties and duties of legislative power and 
subdue the judicial power. The forms of patriarchal power 
represented another feature of Mexican government before 
and after the Mexican Revolution.  
 
2. THE MEXICAN ENTREPRENEURIAL, PRI-
PRESIDENCIALIST STATE 
 
Mexican economic nationalism emerged as a result of 
promoting public and private Mexican capital to avoid 
foreign investments, mainly from US. The Mexican State 
was characterized by a historical distrust of capitalism and 
a belief in the ability of the government to intervene and 
regulate economic affairs by explicit constitutional 
mandate [11, p.245]. However, a model of import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) favored private Mexican 
investments and also was understood to provide benefits to 
the population, since the 1930s and until the 1970s. The 
Mexican public sector formed by publicly owned 
corporations enlarged. In 1982 the state property 
enterprises produced 14% of gross national product (GNP), 
received net transfers and equal subsidies to 12.7 per cent 
of GNP and represented the 38 percent of investment in 
fixed capital.  
      
In the name of great conquests of Mexican Revolution, 
during the times of the Mexican welfare  state, 
organizations were constituted which grouped corporately 
militias, peasants, working class and popular sectors that 
evidenced the political control of state’s party bureaucracy 
in power and the “charro” (Mexican horsemen) leaders.     
The “charrismo” (scornful term for union leaders) subdue 
workers to the rules of the official party, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party or Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI). The workers are treated under 
pressures and threats of wage reduction and loss of 
employment, benefits, agricultural credit, traffic of urban 
and rural poverty, etc., to guarantee an important reserve 
of voters.  
 
Although since 1929 all the Mexican presidents came from 
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the economic 
policy continuity did not follow a regular and coherent 
pattern of policy making. Nevertheless, during the period 
of the hegemonic PRI, the government cultivated a degree 
of social consent that avoided levels of repression in such 
a situation that has been called the “perfect dictatorship”. 
In line with the so-called meta-constitutional powers, the 
President of Mexico was also the true head of the PRI and 
had as his duty the designation of national leaders and 
candidates for popular election. The Mexican president 
had both extensive constitutional and unwritten supra 
constitutional powers and committed to the retention of his 
political power during his mandate and the continuation of 
his power required to follow the “ritual” of choosing who 
was his successor. 
      
As a ruling political party, in the sense that it dominated 
the country’s political life, the PRI held power in the 
federal executive branch of Mexican government during 
71 years. It was the center of the Mexican political system 
through political control mechanisms of workers, peasants 
and popular sectors and organizations, such as 
“cuadillismo” (leadership), corporatism, etc. Also, 
institutional control mechanisms of electoral processes 
were enforced.  The PRI’s corporatism bet to workers and 
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peasants to whom it promoted but not liberated, 
guarantying them patrimonial rights and with the pretext 
of institutionalizing the Mexican Revolution, it was 
identified trickery with the causes of democracy and social 
justice. Its achievements in both assignments are very poor, 
although it maintained social stability.  The President in 
turn appointed his successor trough phenomena known as 
“tapadismo”  (Overcoat candidate) and the “dedazo” (the 
finger pointed) to signal who was the chosen. 
 
Analysts [1] [2] acknowledge three stages in the PRI’s 
evolution: Hegemonic, bipartisan, pluripartisan.  The 
hegemonic stage goes from 1929 to 1979, the PRI 
dominates over the other political forces to which it was 
infinitely superior and maintains total control of political  
power. During the bipartisan stage, which goes from 1979 
to 1985, the PRI maintains dominance over political 
parties from the opposition but lost positions in municipal 
and state governments in front of the National Action 
Party or Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Du ring the 
pluripartisan stage that goes from 1988 throughout the 
2000, it opens the political competence between the PRI, 
PAN and the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
or Democratic Revolution Party) and share the power in 
municipal and state governments.    
 
The effectiveness of the “perfect dictatorship” according to 
Vargas Llosa, or to the presidential monarchy (Ortiz 
Pincheti, 2000) had an era of prosperity which coincides 
with the period of stabilized development, from 1940 to 
1970 and the period of shared development, from 1970 to 
1982. During both periods there had been great 
advancements in matters of social policy, although never 
poverty and social inequality were eradicated, it emerged a 
strong middle class which claimed spaces for political 
participation. The “perfect dictatorship” was underpinned 
by bloodshed from the less favored Mexicans. The State 
model which distributes power emerged from the Mexican 
Revolution enters into crisis and generates institutionalized 
violence.  
 
After 22 years of monetary stability and sustained growth, 
at the final of the Echeverría’s period (1970-76), the peso 
(Mexican monetary unit) devalued, and economic crisis 
started and the constants tensions between entrepreneurs 
and government officials were crucial. The entrepreneurs 
founded the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial 
(Entrepreneurial Coordinating Council) to defend their 
interests from the intervening state. In 1982, President 
López Portillo nationalized the bank system in the middle 
of a generalized economic crisis caused by a fall of oil 
prices, the devaluation of the peso, the increasing interest 
rates. The country declared practically in default of 
payments. This decision fractured the pact between the 
State and the entrepreneurs. 
 
3. TRANSITION OF MEXICAN STATE: PRI-
PRESIDENTIALIST NEOLIBERAL 
RESTRUCTURING 
 
     Much of Latin America experienced financial crisis in 
the 1980s and the mid-1990s. In Mexico, large economic 
crises occurred in 1976, 1982, 1987 and 1994-95, therefore 
economic crises have been repeated and intense with 
intervening periods of mild economic recovery. Mexicans 
suffered periods of dramatically high inflation and external 
imbalances, devaluation, currency flight, increasing 
unemployment and declining purchasing power. 
 
In front of the pressures to Mexican creditors to guarantee 
payment of external debt, since the beginning of the 
eighties, it was instrumented the so-called “Washington 
Consensus” which imposes the infallible neoliberal rule of 
free market and a democratic system with free elections. 
Therefore, the “neoliberal agenda” which proposed 
structural adjustment programs and economic stability 
were imposed as the conditions to negotiate the Mexican 
“debt crises” of 1982, 1987 and 1994-95 by the 
international financial organizations such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
Interamerican Development Bank. 
 
Thus, after the 1982 crisis, Mexico entered in a painful, 
distressful and controversial period of state restructuring, 
which implied the economic reorganization, national 
market openness, elimination of commercial barriers, 
elimination of price controls and subsidies, privatization of 
public enterprises and state property, reduction of social 
policy expenses, free money exchange. Also wide political 
reforms an administrative modernization. It was 
abandoned the import substitution model and it was called 
into question the economic intervention of the state.    
  
The main thrust of the reforms encouraged in Mexico was 
to develop a competitive, broad-based export sector of 
nontraditional goods. Mexico joins the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1986 and becomes a 
manufacture exporter. The reduction of state structure and 
faculties, privatization state owned enterprises and the 
economic deregulation, were the strategies adopted for the 
design of the Mexican State, as it were also for other states.  
  
Starting with the implementation of these reforms to the 
Mexican State, this begins to loss its capacities and 
functions of nation state, although it maintains high 
indicators of intervention, in such a way that the reforms 
benefited to the owners of capital. These reforms to the 
structure of the Mexican State’s apparatus give sense to its 
transition and change from the welfare state model 
towards a neoliberal state model. This transition and 
change are understood in terms of Roitman as forms of 
behavior, loss of centrality in politics, loss in the building 
of wide citizenship, transformation of politics in one 
electoral technique, in a market problem. Also, in loss of 
the ethics and principles as the task of politics and the 
political, evidently appeared in Mexico during the 
government of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and 
continued with Salinas de Gortari (1988-94), also with 
Zedillo (1994-2000) and now with Fox (2000-2006), [3].     
 
But the crisis of 82 also was meaningful for the “crisis of 
hegemony” which was present in the old alliance between 
the state and the entrepreneurs representing the national 
capital and the direct beneficiaries of economic policies 
based in the import substitution model. Nationalization of 
the bank system was the event that provoked the rupture 
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between the political and entrepreneurial hegemonic block 
and their representatives, the politicians and government 
officials from the party of the state and the fractions of the 
great capital. As it is said by Fazio [10], they were living 
in one tortuous lover relationship of subterranean blurred 
rinses, in dense shady deals and complicity networking. 
  
With nationalization of the bank system, Mexican 
capitalists who felt were betrayed had broken the alliance 
with the political bureaucracy and redefined the strategy to 
their re-composition.  Under the impulse of a intervening 
state but with a strong neoliberal technocrat orientation to 
benefit the owners of great capital, it was initiated the 
reinventing of the new Mexican State. This was based on a 
process of neo corporatist negotiation between the 
entrepreneurs and the government, building on mutual 
compromises and interests.     
 
   
A.  Economic and political impact of globalization upon 
the Mexican State 
 
Under the influx of the PRI, the Mexican State initiated 
economic modernization and its insertion in globalization 
processes. As a response to the trends of economic 
globalization of markets and the technological revolution 
which advanced during the last two decades of the past 
century and with the pretext of cleaning economics, the 
Mexican State has privatized strategic enterprises of the 
public sector. Most of these privatized enterpris es have 
been acquired by foreign investments that have penetrated 
already in all the economic sectors. The high concentration 
of capital in few corporations through privatization 
processes of public enterprises, have unchained the 
phenomena of political privatization.    
 
In 1987 inflation achieved 159 per cent and a crack in the 
stock exchange devoured savers. In the interior of the PRI, 
a dissident group formed the Democratic Current 
(Corriente Democrática) that later split to form a new party, 
the Frente Democrático Nacional (National Democratic 
Front). President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-88) 
is the first that stands questionings in his sixth and last 
governmental inform. The sixth of July of 1988, Salinas 
achieves power in the middle of a generalized crisis of 
legitimacy and total discredit for the fall of the system, 
which controlled results of the electoral contests, where 
irregularities and electoral fraud were present.  
 
Salinas deepened the neoliberal reforms: public enterprises 
were liquidated, the economic openness was accelerated, 
free commerce agreements were  signed with Chile, with 
United Sates and Canada (NAFTA), Venezuela and 
Colombia (Group of Three), Costa Rica, Nicaragua and 
Bolivia. Amendments to Constitutional Article 27 allowed 
investments in the Mexican countryside. The activism of 
the Mexican State during the Salinism allowed the 
transference of public enterprises to determined financial 
groups that maintained links of political complicity.  
 
Programs of privatization of public enterprises in Mexico 
have been vast in approaches and to a certain point, 
successful in reduction of the role of one state that was 
interventionist in the economy. Mexico was the second in 
privatization in Latin America during the decade of the 
nineties when the government transferred to particulars, 
assets that amounted 31, 458 millions of dollars, that 
represented 20.4 percent of the total sale of state owned 
enterprises in Latin America. Privatization achieved an 
amount of 3, 160 millions of dollars in 1990, to increase to 
11, 289 millions in 1991 and to total 6, 924 millions of 
dollars in 1992.  
 
By June of 1992, the Mexican government had privatized 
361 of around 1200 enterprises owned by the state. 
Privatization made during 1993 represented 2, 131 
millions of dollars. In 1996 increased to 1, 526 millions of 
dollars, in 1997 increased to 4, 496 millions and in 1998 
sales were 999 millions of dollars. A report from the 
World Bank signals that between 1990 and 1998, 
privatization of public enterprises achieved an amount of 
154, 225 millions of dollars, amount only inferior to the 
balance of the total external debt of Mexico that was of 
159, 959 millions of dollars in 1998. 
 
The year in which the state has caught more for 
privatization was 1991 with a total of 11, 289 millions of 
dollars, while in 1998, Mexico caught 999 millions of 
dollars. The new government of Mexico plans to privatize 
airports, railways and in the energy sector, the oil and 
electrical industry. 
 
The benefit of privatization has not been the greater to the 
Mexicans besides those defenders try to demonstrate the 
opposite. According to data of Salinas de Gortari  (1988-
94), privatization opened budget spaces to finance social 
expenses without running into fiscal deficit. The effects 
have not been overall satisfactory.  Programs of 
privatization in Mexico had reduced the employment to 
half while production had increased in 54.3 percent 
besides a significant reduction in investments. A prior 
study of  Galal et al. (1992) analyze performance after 
privatization of twelve companies in different countries, 
including Mexico, documenting that had incremented in 
26 percent of  profits in eleven cases and increment of 
benefits to workers in three cases only.   
 
The 17th of December of 1993, Congress of United State 
approved the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Reactions were not waiting too much. The First 
of January of 1994, the date in which the Agreement 
started to come into force, the indigenous people of the 
State of Chiapaz upraised as the National Liberation 
Zapatista Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional). Quarrels, resentment and bitterness of political 
groups to the interior of the PRI conducted to assassination 
of the official candidate to the Presidency of the Republic 
and to the assassination of the General Secretary of the 
PRI.  Although the conflictive situation and the serious 
problems, the economy did not disarrayed and Salinas give 
his sixth and last inform in 1994 with a victorious 
animosity. Zedillo arrives to the Presidency with the major 
democratic legitimacy given by the greatest number of 
votes given in his favor in the history of Mexico, 17 
millions. But suddenly, after twenty-one days in power, 
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Zedillo faced the worst economic crises in history of 
Mexico, the so-called December’s Mistake. 
 
Two years after privatization of Mexico’s banking system, 
Mexico was forced to devaluate its peso in December 1994 
which set off a macroeconomic crisis characterized by 
increased exchange rate volatility, devaluation of the peso 
followed by a financial sector crisis and bailout. The 
meltdown of the Mexican stock exchanges has lost half its 
value, and share prices for major Mexican companies 
quoted on Wall Street have dropped 75 percent in a few 
months. However, the deeper cris is in financial markets 
after it had been resolved the devaluation and the 
sovereign-default crises. The majority of governmental 
credits with a degree of not investment (case of Mexico), 
are characterized by weaknesses in governance. If local 
people and foreign investors fear the Mexican peso will be 
devaluated, they may convert pesos into dollars. 
 
A new structure of sovereign debt during the Mexican 
crisis of 1994-95 has been widely studied to understand 
the way in which financial markets, governments and 
multilateral institutions respond to the new questions of 
governance. The Mexican crisis left as a teaching the 
problem to sustain fixed exchange rates in an environment 
of high mobility of international capital. Mexico did not 
recovered because it weak financial system became strong 
with the intervention of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). But because it had benefited with the increment of 
exports to United States as a result of the North America 
Free Trade Agreement and the accelerated growth of the 
neighbor economy.   
  
The economic crises through which the Mexican economy 
has passed, besides the institutional weaknesses to limit 
the range in social tissue have been the repercussions of 
the applications of the neoliberal economic policy and the 
key factors to deteriorate social governance. One of the 
most pervasive and disturbing aspects of economic crisis 
has been the effect of this policy on the most vulnerable 
population groups. In general terms, the economic policies 
implemented in the majority of Latin American countries 
present coincident features, although there are some 
differences in the design of the packs.   
 
However, the motives and circumstances of different 
economic crisis by which it has pass through Mexico since 
1976 to 1994-95 differ although they have been preceded 
by periods of high economic growth which could not be 
sustained by the imbalance they caused. The crisis of 1976 
showed the limitations of the economic model, which 
considered that the economic growth depended of a major 
state intervention. The crisis of 1982 had its origin in the 
consideration that oil was the lever of economic 
development oriented toward an active policy of the state 
prepared to administer the abundance, which had derived 
in high degrees of external indebtedness and irrational 
expansion of the state.  
 
Compared with the debt crisis of the eighties and with the 
Mexican crisis of 1994-95, also called the “Tequila effect”, 
both are considered to have as roots the financial 
imbalances of the public sector. Quite different was the 
later crisis,  (Asia, Russia, South Africa, Brazil, etc.) 
which have its roots in financial imbalances of the private 
sector and which is the first financial crisis really 
considered as global that kick the economies of emergent 
markets. The Asian crisis exploded just after the crisis’s 
weaves of the Mexican peso had lowered. Therefore, it 
seems that financial crisis occur more frequently in the last 
years in emergent economies, such as it is the case of 
Mexico.   
 
If it is controlled the democratic social development and 
the economic growth of emerging economies, these are not 
of more significance corrupts than the countries more 
developed. The pack of credits to Mexico from the 
International Monetary Fund in 1995 was a reward to 
corruption of bank credits with more risks. While more 
lend governments of other countries to Mexico, the 
bankers of other countries have more security to recover 
their credits. In reality, privatization of the bank system to 
financial groups emerged from the “steam” and complicity 
among investors and politicians who took advantage of 
international organizations financing channeled to the 
rescue of the debt crisis. However, their differences in 
crisis management took them into highly indebted 
economies, which had the opportunity to transfer invoices 
charged to society. 
  
As a result of these events, in Mexico was initiated in 1995 
a Program of Modernization of Public Management and 
the elimination of corruption, decentralization of public 
function and reorganization of intergovernmental 
relationships within the federal system. The monopoly of 
power and its discretional use maintained by some 
members in the structures of government is the main 
source of corrupt behaviors and impunity, thus it is 
required deep institutional reforms. 
  
The program pretends to develop mechanisms to a major 
responsibility and accountancy to governmental agencies, 
in matter of management of public services, also to ensure 
a major disposition to establish associations with non-
governmental organizations. It is necessary to consider 
those non-governmental organizations of human, political, 
labor, and citizen rights have sustained poor relations with 
governments emanated from the PRI, which always treated 
to corporate them while they wanted to be more 
independent, the base of credibility and impartiality before 
the citizens they represented.  
 
In 1996, public and private investments in Mexico kept 
under the levels of the years seventies and eighties. Results 
of globalization processes confirmed that it has given in 
only one direction: the entrance of transnational and 
multinational enterprises, now denominated global 
enterprises or contemporary business, which in essence are 
foreign, they have taken in legal ownership the natural 
resources, land, etc., and leave few benefits. For example, 
the market value of General Electric calculated in 520, 250 
millions of dollars, it is equivalent to the GNP of Mexico. 
In fact, 23 of the greatest transnational and multinational 
corporations have sales that amount a higher value that the 
GNP of Mexico. Neoliberal governments have showed 
their inefficiency to reduce pains from integration 
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processes through negotiations more favorable that allow 
to take comparative and competitive advantages.   
 
4.  DAMNED INHERITANCE 
 
At the end of the period between the years 1982 and 2000 
which marks the development and implementation of the 
Neoliberal state model in Mexico, the results are disastrous. 
Although the achievements in economic growth during the 
last four years, the Mexican economy shows several 
structural imbalances that were expressed in their 
correspondent fiscal deficit. As Lomas [17] [18] affirms, 
the inheritance of President Zedillo also included the great 
pressure that the service of passives from financial rescue 
will exercise over public finances in the medium term 
range. Lamentable it is foreseeable that the present 
administration will inheritance to the next government a 
great quantity of compromises over the public finances 
and much more insufficiencies in the attention to the more 
sensible demands of population. The Zedillo´s inheritance 
ascents to more that two billions (millions of millions in 
Mexico) in public debt, including the debts of the wasted 
Institute for the Protection of Bank Savings or Instituto 
para la Protección del Ahorro Bancario (IPAB). 
 
 a. Interface government - companies  
In Mexico, the main obstacles for the managers are the 
crime and the robbery, continued by an inadequate 
infrastructure offer, inflation, corruption and financing. 
However, companies that don't pay taxes exist  
b. Unjust distribution of income  
President Zedillo leaves a country with big differences in 
distribution of income, a high wealth concentration in a 
minority and a majority in the poverty, which was 
increased, from 40.5 to 45.5 million Mexicans. According 
to estimates of the Cepal, 26 millions, mainly indigenous 
and rural, live in the misery. Contradictions of growth 
polarize, according to Boltvinik, expert in the poverty and 
distribution of income in Mexico. He says that when the 
economic pattern continued up to now in Mexico, it is able 
to generate growth. However it makes it accompanied by a 
growing concentration of income and an increment of 
poverty among the poorer strata. The crisis of 94 produced 
a brutal impoverishment of the population. Starting 1996, 
when it begins to recover the economy, the income 
concentrates again. In one period like the current one, in 
which the Mexican economy crosses for a peak when 
accumulating 18 serial trimesters of growth, the benefits 
go to a very reduced group of people: “down they only fall 
the crumbs” it sentences. [6].  
The poverty increased from 36 to 38 percent of the total 
Mexican homes in 1994 to 45 to 47 percent in 1998. With 
data of the National Survey of Income-Expense in Homes 
(ENIGH), among 1994 and 1998, Mexican homes that live 
under the line of poverty, with a monthly income not 
bigger to 560 pesos at a constant value of April of 1994, 
increased from 69 to 76 percent of the total. In general 
terms, researchers coincide in that the poverty increased in 
more than 5 percent during the sexenio of Zedillo. This 
redounds in the formation of a society with big contrasts in 
the distribution of income, where 20 million Mexicans (the 
total population's 20%), live under conditions of extreme 
poverty and more than 40 millions (the population's 40%), 
live below the line of poverty.  
In the last three sexenios, control of inflation has been 
privileged above the increases to contractual minimum 
wages, and therefore, of level of workers' life. The World 
Bank presents figures in those that 42 million Mexicans 
have salary levels below the twenty daily pesos, the 
equivalent of less than 2 dollars daily. Between 1974 and 
the 2000, the real wage of workers had an accumulated 
deterioration of 72%. Only during the government of 
Zedillo a strong loss accumulated was presented near to 50 
percent of the real wages, registering the lowest 
purchasing power in the last 18 years. With data of the 
Organization of the United Nations, the 64.5 of the 
population perceive two insufficient minimum wages to 
obtain the nutritional minimal. Women sustain 40 percent 
of the Mexican homes with almost 20 percent inferior 
incomes to those of the men [14]. More than half of 
Mexicans in age of being working they do work in the 
informal sector of the economy. 
The gross internal product per cápita ascended to 7776 
annual dollars, with a growth of 3.4 percent on the average 
annual, during the period 1964-1981. However, when after 
l982 it began the implementation of the model of the 
Neoliberal State in Mexico, the growth of the gross 
internal product fell. For the period of the Neoliberal State, 
which lasts since 1982 to 2000, the gross internal product 
per cápita only grew 0.3 percent on the average yearly. 
The National Survey of Income-expense in Homes, carried 
out in the year 2000, reports that the generation of the 
wealth increased in the last six years, but the distribution 
of the wealth became more inequitable, with alarming 
levels of deterioration. 
10 percent of the richest homes in the country concentrate 
38.11 percent of the national income. In the other end, the 
tenth part of the poorest hardly perceives 1.50 percent of 
the total, when in 1996 it was of 1.79 percent. The 
available monthly income by 10 percent of the poorest 
homes is 26 inferior percent to that of 1994, while for the 
tenth part of the most suitable homes the reduction has 
been of 20 percent [6]. The coefficient of GINI for the 
monetary income in 1992 was of 0.5086, in 1994 it was of 
0.5137 and in the 2000 of 0.4889, which indicates a 
tendency to decrease. However the concentration of the 
national wealth, continues being high. 
The quick economic growth has not rebounded in the 
improvement of levels of the population's life, due to the 
inequitable distribution of income that impedes the transfer 
of macroeconomic benefits. The higher rates of growth 
that reached four percent on the average of the gross 
internal product between 1996 and 2000 have not 
contributed to the improvement of the well being and 
standard of families’ life, because they contribute in 2.4 
percent real product per cápita. According to analysis of El 
Financiero [9], of each peso (Mexican money) that was 
generated in the economy in the first trimester of the year, 
0.07 cents corresponded the population of scarce resources, 
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while the population with high levels of incomes obtained 
50 cents. 
Regional development has also been inequitable and 
unbalanced, subject to processes of economic separation 
that have been the result of the integration processes 
guided toward the markets of the North that the country 
lives since 1994 when Free Trade Agreement was signed 
with North America. This way, the Mexicans with lower 
income per cápita concentrate on seven States of the 
country´s Southeast. They represent less than 10 percent of 
the national gross internal product, while with a similar 
population, six States of the North generate 23 percent of 
the national wealth. The export pattern of growth based on 
cheap manpower, only allows that a small group of 
companies benefits of the commercial treaties of Mexico 
with other countries 
c. Weakness of governance 
The weak governance in Mexico, for example, has its 
antecedents in the weaknesses of the economic, social, 
cultural, educational politicians, etc. and in the weaknesses 
of their institutions although in the past a strong presence 
of the Mexican State existed in the creation of institutions 
and of public policy. They are characterized as weaknesses 
of the governance: the official and private corruption, the 
traffic of influences, the corruption and inefficiency of the 
judicial organs, the influence drug cartels. Moreover, 
deficiencies in the internal security under the form of 
guerilla group operating in rural areas, and the violence in 
the big cities. 
 
Governance deficit is related with the genuineness of the 
political system, which had its origin in the economic 
policies erroneously implemented by the elites that made 
the organizational design for the transition of the Mexican 
State. Mexico has lived populisms centered more in the 
expectations of illuminated rulers than in concrete 
proposals of national development by means of an 
institutional development. The Mexican State has been 
able to maintain its genuineness by means of a politics of 
partial social protection and future promises of more 
benefits that favor to the diverse social groups.  
 
At the present time, the form in which it is visualized in 
Mexico, the installation of governance decreases to 
achieve the political normality. It is a concern to 
subordinate the electoral democracy to the governance of 
the system and not necessarily the democracy, such as it is 
expressed in the Political Constitution of United Mexican 
States. The Constitution defines democracy  “not only as a 
judicial structure and a political régime, but as a system of 
life been founded in the constant economic, social and 
cultural improvement of the population.” The electoral 
democracy not only has as sufficient conditions, free and 
fair elections, but the electoral processes only spread to be 
freer and fairer when it is the culmination of a continuous 
democratic process and not when it is subordinated. 
 
d. Political uncertainty and security of the property 
 
For the case of Mexico specifically, a factor of the political 
risk consistently high (qualified as " BB ", non-investment 
degree) it is the quality of governance that embraces the 
quality of public sector’s institution; the efficiency of the 
government services and the government's capacity to 
establish the macroeconomic stability. In an analysis of 
dynamic factors, the estimate of the index of monthly 
national risk is decisive for the proportions of the imports 
to the reservations and the debt to the exports. In the 
national risk, the sociopolitical uncertainty is an important 
component. 
 
An important aspect is to determine the uncertainties 
involved in the transfers of the regular governments in 
order to evaluate the possible uncertainties of the 
elaboration of the laws. The government's constitutional 
positions (as a result of the elections) they are usually 
accompanied by big changes in the rules and regulations 
that have an impact in the business. 
 
With regard to the uncertainties of the application of the 
law, it is important to determine if the companies trust the 
abilities of the authorities of the State to protect the rights 
of property and to guarantee a predictive judicial process. 
The robbery and crime are serious problems that 
substantially can increase the costs of making business. 
There is not trust in that the authorities of the State protect 
to people and their property of criminal actions. The 
unpredictability of the judiciary presents a bigger problem 
for the operations of the business. The public insecurity in 
Mexico has placed to the country in a near situation to the 
chaos, surpassing to the institutions that were already the 
pillars of a system in decomposition, as the case of the PRI. 
 
The governments priístas leave as balances those “wounds 
opened up in the national conscience” for the indigenous 
conflicts of Chiapaz. The results are: increasing levels of 
poverty, the growth of the informal economy, the 
increment of the violence and public insecurity, corruption 
and impunity, the precarious conditions of micro, small 
and large enterprises and the deterioration of the 
countryside and farming sector. 
 
In sum, the current problem of Mexico is to have a good 
macroeconomics but a bad microeconomics. 
  
5. THE TRANSITION OF THE RÉGIME OF THE 
MEXICAN STATE: OF THE STATE MANAGER TO 
THE STATE OF THE MANAGERS 
 
The pattern of party of State, and more concretely of the 
Mexican PRI-state it has been drained. The fall of PRI 
from the federal government and their loss of absolute 
majority in the Congress of the Union in the last elections 
is an event that constitutes a new stage that gives place to 
the alternation of the National Action Party in the Mexican 
political power. Contrary to the other alternations in the 
power that there has been in Mexico, this has been for the 
peaceful road and in an atmosphere of political stabil ity, 
materializing the arrival of a party contrary to the one 
which used to held the power. 
 
During the last four administrations has not been evident 
the transfer of power under conditions of economic and 
political stability. It was necessary the disappearance of 
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the State - PRI. The last sexenio priísta coincides more 
with a party change than with changes of a political régime 
centered in a party of State and characterized by the 
hegemony of a political party. The hegemonic party was 
the PRI that held the power for a period of seventy one 
years, from 1929 to 2000. It served to sustain a 
presidential system with meta-constitutionals powers, 
omnipotent about the other powers (legislative and judicial) 
and over the spheres of the economic life, politics, social 
and cultural. 
 
Government's change implies agreed and not agreed 
accommodations among the political and economic 
interests. First, the President’s relinquishment of 
constitutional powers and the system of patronage 
established by the PRI to all the presidents who have 
emerged from its ranks. However, the party change in the 
government can maintain the same presidential structures 
whose more remote antecedents are in the Huei Tlatoani, 
or maximum Lord, military, civil and religious boss 
among our Aztec ancestors that then derived in a political 
culture. For a true change of political régime, it is 
necessary many reformations and such structural 
transformations as agreeing reformations to the Law of 
Public Administration to change the political culture and 
reformations to the government régime.  Also, to 
strengthen the Legislative power, to free the judicial power 
and to delimit the Executive power, especially in their 
attributions as government's boss and of boss of State.       
  
In the last two decades, amid big financial crisis and with a 
neoliberal project of economic policy, it stopped the 
growth during the decade of the eighty and it was 
accelerated during the last four years of the ninety.  It gave 
big imbalances and separations as a result in the economic 
processes and the dismantlement of the defense’ 
mechanisms of the Mexican State. During the decadent 
stage of the system PRI-presidencialist, the corruption 
increased, the social cohesion was destroyed and the levels 
of poverty increased alarmingly. It concentrated the 
income “in favor of a minority that coincides in its 
composition and voracity with the elite of Creole 
inheritors and beneficiaries of the system of chaste of the 
colonial time and of the porfirista system.” So, partly the 
defeat of the PRI like hegemonic party was due to the 
collective repulsion to an economic politics that has 
increased the levels of poverty, corruption and social 
violence. The PRI lost capacity of response in front of a 
more active civil society. 
 
The last President of the PRI, Zedillo, “cut his finger” that 
it designated its successor and it inherited him the power, 
to open the tri-colored candidate's election. It was not able 
to brake the purchase and coercion machinery of the vote. 
But it disciplined to the most reactionary to impede that 
they stole the election again and then, when losing in the 
war in front of the other parties, to open the way to a 
democratic transition that re invents the system. In few 
hours it has transited from a régime of hegemonic party 
and authoritarian government, toward a more democratic 
system, concluding the process of democratic transition, 
handling over power in conditions of political normality 
and without uncertainty about the change of government 
or regime. 
 
The transition occurred from monopartidism to democracy. 
However, this democratic transition is very questioned to a 
certain extent, because what has really been given is a 
party change in the power. In any transition, it is evident 
that the total abdication of those powers that have to do 
with the control of political process would have left power 
vacuums whose consequences would have been adverse. 
Still more, it is to be seen if the democratic system 
improves life conditions of Mexicans. Certainly, there is 
not a change of polit ical régime, but the deepening of the 
neoliberal economic policy that has been already applying 
in Mexico since the middle of the eighties. It finishes the 
era of 71 years of the hegemonic party, the PRI, and it is 
expected that it also finish the era of the Mexican 
presidencialism. 
 
The change of the sexenio and of political party in power 
under the same political régime, the same as the access 
form to the political power has been for the democratic 
road, what has modified the expectations and performance 
of the operation of the national public life. Partly these 
changes have been the result of the fill created by the 
political party that it came governing. However, it is 
highly questionable the form in that it was appealed to the 
“useful vote”, and not to the “ethical vote of the principles 
and the projects.” The voters had being conditioned that it 
was the change in the PAN and had being built a space of 
electoral market about a falsehood that was accepted. 
Although they have explained reason and that “it didn't 
mean a contention dike at all to the neoliberalism but only 
to take out the PRI of The Pines” [24]. 
 
For some skeptical critics what happens is a simple change 
in the form of making the things, more than in the content 
of the same ones. By all possible means viable along three 
years it was satanized the PRI and it was sold the 
depoliticized youth the idea of the necessity and possibility 
of the alternation in the political power to create them 
scenarios where multiplied opportunities of social mobility, 
education and employment. 
  
The change of political party in the same régime represents 
a rupture of the old Mexican political system and 
continuity in the development processes according to the 
neoliberal pattern imposed by the interests of the 
transnational capital. This way, the change can be 
significant because it represents a final balance of a régime 
presidencialist and of its neoliberal economic model. 
 
With the party change in the power finishes the era of the 
PRI, already well known as the era of the dinosaurs, with 
22 presidents of the same party that covers a period of 
seventy one years. Members of the “revolutionary family”, 
with a style of governing patrimonialist where investiture 
and attributable public goods to the public position are 
considered personal property. As well as to the paternalism 
that facilitates the political control through the corporatist 
practices, clientele and corrupted of those who have less 
resources, but tied to chains of corruption and complicities. 
The corporate interests that conditioned the vote of the 
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citizens also oppressed their political and human rights. It 
is interesting to analyze the changes of the antecedents of 
the presidents’ careers being the first ones militaries who 
gave the power to the lawyers, then to give opportunity to 
the economists and finally a manager. 
 
When opening up the alternation to the Presidency of the 
Republic, the end of the last sexenio priísta has been 
different to the last four sexenios that left as inheritance 
economic crisis and political deterioration, although the 
evident expressions of political decomposition, violence 
and corruption still persist. In the last two sexenios, that of 
the Presidents technocrats that privatized the politics, 
Salinas (1988-94) and Zedillo (1994-2000), they 
represented the two big local groups of officials and 
managers politically with being able to real. The two 
technocrat presidents had as characteristic to govern in 
function of personal focuses of the social and power 
relationships.  Both had being able to give place to the 
emergency of complicity between the technocrats and the 
managers enlarging the relationship capital-politics, the 
men that hold the economic power, without respecting the 
rules of the system neither the correlation of social forces 
and politics. 
 
The Mexican technocracy has been insensitive and 
indifferent to the social problems. Both, Salinas and 
Zedillo can be identified more than as rulers, as 
administrators or managers of the economic politics. The 
strategy on which they centered the implementation of the 
neoliberal model consisted on maintaining a reduced group 
of technocrat economists in a network of alliances and 
complicity with capitalist groups. These capitalist groups 
are those that Ortíz Pinchetti [19] denominated the 
nomenklatura, with insatiable financial interests and that 
they were the main beneficiaries of the model. In the 
strategy of Salinas, through supports to the PAN, it was 
lever up politically to their group of managerial and 
financial interest, in their top mega-negotiations with the 
group of Zedillo (Grove, 2000) in which they killed the 
PRI. The decentralization of the power begun for Salinas 
and deepened by Zedillo. They consolidated the neoliberal 
economic model. 
  
Salinas first and later Zedillo, governed with 
authoritarianism to implant the economic policy imposed 
by supra national institutions and they were flexible in 
politics where they enlarged the political freedoms with 
pragmatic approaches, provided they didn't contravene the 
economic politics. The principle is completed this way that 
all economic reformation without the political reformation 
is insufficient and it originates dangerous contradictions. 
The modernization project of the technocrat presidents, 
neoliberal and globalized, was promoted by the 
governments of the PRI. It also had to pay giving up 
power, because it has not been able to give benefits to 
most of the population, because it was sustained 
substantially in an economic order different to which 
guided the emanated governments of the Mexican 
Revolution. 
 
In the sixth inform of Zedillo´s government, the Deputy of 
the opposition Batres accuses him of seeking to be a 
“Robin Hood the other way around, all time that condemns 
the poor to give to the rich ones….” The neoliberal 
governments affirm, they have acted in way “wicked, 
anything moves them and their big works are their 
business that in some years allowed to enrich some” [25]. 
But the unusual thing was that the same parliamentarian 
fractions of the PRI abandoned the old habit of leaving in 
their president's defense to criticize it recognizing mistakes 
and inefficiencies of their administration. The social 
dissent only can make to lose the project of neoliberal 
modernization, which supposes a period of measures of 25 
year-old adjustment during which seek to conserve the 
power, based on the control of the income of the hard-
working one and not of the capital. 
 
Although it was privileged the stability and the renovation 
of the economic growth with high rates of gross internal 
product that reached 7.8 percent in the first trimester of the 
2000, Zedillo closes the period priísta without having 
completed their campaign promise, the so yearned one 
“well-being for their families.” He also leaves dismantled 
public institutions that promoted the social well being. 
However, it is troublesome that the highs rates of growth 
of the gross internal product are transitory and one cause 
more than the crises with high costs to those that we have 
gotten used in the past. 
     
The decentralization of the power was initiated by Salinas 
and deepened by Zedillo. They consolidated a scenario of 
power shared with divided governments formed by the 
electoral advances of having left opponents to the PRI, 
which constitute the federal, state and municipal 
governments' real counterbalances. The consolidation of 
this new project of modernization that strengthens to the 
PAN, the natural relief that “it only seeks reformations in 
the level of the political administration that should suppose 
the neoliberal modernization” in accordance with 
Montemayor (2000). The PAN advances this way the 
neoliberal and globalizer project and it is opened the way 
to a federal and municipal administration in accordance 
with the “modernity.” 
 
 This way, the PRI suffers an involution for the processes 
of adjustment of the project during these last 18 years. 
Among those that highlight its own ideological 
transformation to make comfortable to the neoliberal 
principles, completely opposed to the revolutionary 
ideology and which it converts to the modern stage of the 
Mexican Revolution. Montemayor (2000) argues that the 
PRI bet, for obedience, against itself. The project of 
modernization “it tunneled their structure and, mainly, the 
understood values of balance of forces and groups that 
participated in the previous Mexican political system.” For 
the neoliberals, the adjustment measures taken during the 
last three governments from Mexico are correct and for the 
same thing, the conflicts of the country only come from 
the corruption and the inefficiency of governments' príistas. 
Another reading of the fall of the régime of the PRI-State 
is the disfunctionality that reached the bureaucracy of the 
administrative apparatus. With high levels of corruption 
and inefficiency, with an authoritarian and vertical 
structure that it only responded to the decisions 
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presidencialistas but it showed its inability to give answer 
to the demands of the citizenship. To this type of 
organization of the public administration, according to 
Barboza Rodríguez “it obeys the generation of many 
useless works and an enormous waste. And, not few times, 
a sector builds what another destroys. The Mexicans only 
know about those “white elephants” for the dance of 
millions of pesos. The tangible benefits are null or poor 
when there are them.” [4]. 
 The XXI century it begins in Mexico with the new 
paradigm of government manager. The PAN wins the 
elections to the Presidency of Mexico in the 2000 with the 
charismatic Vicente Fox. He was the candidate that with a 
marketing campaign guided to emphasize the contradiction 
régime-antirégimen, it felt call to take out the PRI of The 
Pines, the presidential residence, giving this way had 
finished the end of the régime of the PRI and beginning a 
new cycle. Partly, people voted against the PRI more than 
in favor of Fox. Fox has said that its government will be of 
transition toward the new democratic régime. In their 
speech of August 2 when he received his Certificate of 
Elected President, Fox sustained emphatic: “I will head a 
government of plural transition and inclusive, capable, 
with vision of State and with high standards of honesty 
and quality” (Macroeconomics, 2000). 
The endogamy of the Party-state in the power during 71 
years had generating a perverse structure with big hang-
ups that the Mexican society no longer tolerated. Fox was 
the beneficiary of the decisive vote of the excluded poor of 
the big urban centers and of those of the rural areas and 
natives stragglers that renounced of the PRI. However, the 
supposition was not completed that the “green vote” of the 
rural and excluded areas would decide the elections in 
favor of the PRI, although this party still obtained majority, 
but smaller than in the last federal elections of 1994. This 
electoral behavior had not shown previously because the 
voters also differentiate its vote for not granting all the 
power to a single party. 
In these elections of the 2000, for the first time in 71 years, 
the PRI loses the presidency of the Republic, 
transcendental event for the political life of the country 
because it radically changed the political perspective and 
the national expectations. This defeat of the PRI like 
hegemonic political party in power, it is been of “the 
progressive destruction of the social cohesion: those norms 
and expressed and implicit pacts that maintained us 
together to the Mexicans. And this was due to the 
government's inclination to favor to the Creole oligarchy 
and the monopolized concentration of capital” according 
to Ortíz Pinchetti  [19] [20].  
On the other hand, Touraine [27] argues that the result of 
the elections have just put an end to the long reign of the 
PRI. It had been able to prepare reinforcement of the 
political action and of the intervention of the State in a 
country whose growth has not reduced the social 
inequality. The economy grows but it doesn't distribute the 
benefits of the growth, that is to say, it generates wealth 
but it also generates poverty. The opposite, the reduction 
of the weight of the State, is announced although the 
public sector has been traditionally weak in Mexico. The 
insert of Mexico in the economy global files the options of 
the power of institutional change of the State.  
It has opened up and overflows the Mexican political 
system for movements that guided by the change they give 
beginning to the protest and the public debate more than to 
a new political project, more however, this democratic 
project only understands each other from the politics’ 
despolitización.  
In fact, the political and economic project of Fox gives 
continuity to the project of the technocrats. More than to 
be a transition, because the only thing that one gives is not 
a change of political régime but of party alternation in the 
power, although the ideal thing had been the alternation 
with alternative, the necessary alternation in the 
government, given system the conditions of the parties. In 
any event, the political transition has been possible thanks 
to that the same neoliberal model has disarticulated to the 
civil society and the citizenship. What has passed in 
Mexico, according to several analysts is that “a democracy 
of type caudillista triumphed before a weakened left and in 
a mark of weak political parties and unstructured that 
reflect decadent and centralist elite rather” [18]. However, 
it is highly questionable until where the traffic has been 
given to a democratic régime and the sepulcher of a 
régime dictatorial presidencialist. 
More than continuity, the neoliberal pattern is deepened 
with the Fox’ arrival to the presidency of Mexico who 
represents a third moment of the neoliberal economy 
impelled for Saline. Nevertheless, the technocrats have 
been hit politically by the managers, the new political class 
that emerges mainly of the local organizations of small and 
medium managers of the North that have wanted to 
liberate to the country of the corruption and of the 
clientelism of the party of State. The State Manager was 
being dismantled from the arrival from the technocrat 
economists to the power. Now with a manager like 
President from Mexico, the Mexican State has become a 
State of Managers that come the democracy like a good 
business, that is to say, the Coca-colafication of Mexico, in 
reference to the managerial antecedents of Fox in the 
transnational one. 
According to a Canadian managerial leader, for Fox, to 
govern Mexico won't be the same thing that to manage 
Coca Cola, but their managerial experience will help him a 
lot to make decisions [13]. The analyst Rubio [15] 
describes the profile of Fox like “an evidently practical, 
pragmatic person that clearly adapts to the circumstances. 
He makes a very clear sense of his priorities and he makes 
a very clear sense of how to use and for what reason he 
wants to use each one of their people. And in that sense 
what we should wait is a very not very ideological person, 
very not very dogmatic and very adaptive to the 
environment that leaves presenting in each moment."  
It is paradoxical that in a country where more than the 
population's 60% it is poor, win the elections a right party 
that postulates the deepening of the neoliberal model 
responsible for the increase of the poverty. The arrival of 
Fox to the power, according to Fazio [10], it coincides 
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with the consolidation of a concentration process and 
economic oligopolitation and political centralization in the 
taking of decisions.  
With Fox the Mexican presidencialism transits from the 
autism to the democratic caudillism. The arrival of Fox to 
the Presidency of Mexico, according to Krauze (mentioned 
by Fazio, [11] it was the result of “a direct, immediate 
search, managerial to the power. Wines of new marketing 
in old wineskins of caudillism…a caudillism plebiscitery 
with messianic edges, very dangerous in a country to the 
one that he found difficult a lot the separation between the 
church and the State”. Nevertheless, the ghost of the 
presidencialism has not gone away with Fox in the 
presidency that has assumed attitudes of “commander” of 
the town because they are still present the behavior 
patterns that encourage it, overlapped in the existent 
lagoons in the Constitution. A true régime change implies 
a deep Reformation of the State with a new Constitution, 
and in those that the diverse force politicians delimit the 
presidential activity. 
Fox is the first president manager arisen of the local elite 
that is revealed against the center of the country, 
representative of the option of the “ electoralist stream” of 
the managerial elite inside the PAN. Especially the one 
denominated of the fraction of the North or “Group 
Monterrey”, with which has narrow bonds and that 
supported in the ideology of the new Mexican right, it is 
expressed in the pragmatic current or neopanism, opposed 
to the doctrine and the traditional orthodoxy. According to 
the ex leader and twice candidate Panista, Pablo Emilio 
Madero, nephew of the democratic antirreeleccionista 
Francisco I. Madero, “Vicente Fox Quezada 's eventual 
victory in the presidential election would crown the 
agreement of a group of managers.  
 In 1982, these managers decided, in a meeting in Cd. 
Juárez, Chihuachua, to infiltrate and to control the Party 
National Action (PAN) to obtain particular interests. A 
virtual ascent of the neopanism to the power constitutes a 
serious risk for Mexico because the pragmatic principle of 
the personal interest would reign and not of the very 
common one. And once like government would conquer 
them the temptation of the authoritarism to eliminate 
opponents, what would generate national discouragement” 
[26].  
The proposal of change of Fox is considered imprecise 
with regard to the proposal panista. According to Loaeza 
[23] “The and the middle classes that are expressed in it 
are not reactionary, on the contrary. They want a political 
change, they like the modern society, they look toward the 
exterior. Although on the other hand, perhaps be for a 
smaller social inequality but not for an absolute equality, 
because that doesn't interest them. They have a vision anti 
equalitarian of the society, they do not have interest on 
equality but the freedom. Freedom with order that 
yes…the social justice is not a topic panista…”  
Contrary to the doctrinal current, the ideology of the 
neopanism, with certain flashes of fascism, defends the 
“changarro” of the attacks of the official populism. With a 
focus that is distant much of the political social democracy 
with the calls to the “useful vote” that don't recognize 
differences in ideologies more than the simple impulse of 
subtracting the power of the Party of the State. And under 
the presentation of a “virtual party of the unit”, the 
political class is recomposed with the arrival from the 
managers to the formal power. The managers arrive this 
way to the political power from the managerial unions to 
those that belong, mainly of the North of the country, used 
as launching platforms. 
Nevertheless that the neopanism fights the official 
populism, the decomposition of the Mexican political 
system was the main cause that with Fox a new populism 
anti parties arose. According to Touraine [27], this 
political decomposition goes of the hand with the advance 
of the big world economic conglomerates. The one that is 
also expressed in an alternative in the case of Mexico “to 
the Mexican” that difficulty can be considered “like a real 
road for the creation of a true democracy.”  
But in the overflow of these political marks, the same as it 
is dangerous to already give priority to the fall of a régime 
hole of their substance, it is also dangerous to encourage 
the union this way already too strong between a vague 
populism and the economic liberalism. The resistance to 
this populist tendency that attacks at the same time to the 
political system and the intervening capacity of the State 
has to be organized from the popular movements. These 
popular movements have the capacity to manifest and to 
express the popular demands of the sectors less favored, in 
such a way that they really contribute to the renovation of 
the public life.   
The transition to the new régime has not been so smooth 
and soft. The caciques that held the political and economic 
power don't resign to lose. The wounded PRI of death has 
entered in internal disputes for the little power that is and 
the political groups rush however to the defense of their 
interests and their quotas of power with violent 
confrontations. The smoothness of the political transition 
makes suppose that it has been made a pact by those who 
maintain the real power. 
6. THE CHANGE DE PARTY IN THE POWER: THE 
MEXICAN STATE OF THE MANAGERS IN THE 
NEW PERIOD PAN – PRESIDENCIALIST 
The arrival of the managers to the Mexican State means 
the displacement of the politicians of the formal power. In 
other words, what changes is the formal power, because 
the real power remains unalterable. The Mexican Council 
of Businessmen stops to be a group of pressure in the face 
of the power of the State, to become the speaker of the 
managers in front of the federal government, and to 
determine the national economic and political decisions. 
That is to say, the direct taking of the political power by 
the conservative groups that hold the hegemonic economic 
power and national neo-oligarchy subordinated to the 
interests of the transnational capitalism to exercise a new 
governance strategy. 
 This strategy allows them the domain and direct control of 
the means for the achievement of their maximum benefits 
(efficiency), without having necessity to appeal to the inter 
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mediation of a political class that got paid expensive the 
mediation of the arrangements of the production factors. 
This is the case between capital and work, for example. 
However, in the humanity's history, the achievement of the 
efficiency has not brought the social justice. 
The new State of managers draws about to administer the 
existent order efficiently to guarantee to the capital 
transnational globalized the best conditions for its 
investments in Mexico. Already the general coordinator in 
economic matter of the transition team guaranteed “zero 
discrimination” for the Mexican entrepreneurs. On the 
other hand, the leader of one of the most powerful 
organizations of managers omens that the government of 
Fox will be friendlier with the productive sector. Fox has a 
clear vision of the necessities of a company, so that he can 
create wealth and more work sources [5]. 
 Fox represents the alternation in the government and he 
has noticed that the purpose of its public administration is 
to increase efficiency of the government's task until a good 
degree and to eliminate this way all that has to do with 
errors and corruption. “I will delimit the functions that 
subtract effectiveness to the government administration in 
damage of the whole society…we have to put an end to the 
political and administrative centralism and to promote the 
invigoration of our federalism to impel the development of 
the regions and the viability of the municipalities starting 
from their vocation, from their resources and of the 
expectations of their communities.” (Macroeconomics, 
2000).    
His project of reengineering the federal public 
administration follows more the advice of the World Bank. 
Based more on the pragmatism of changing the 
administration without changes in the laws, it is sustained 
in more horizontal and more flexible structures and in 
approaches of efficiency, effectiveness, opportunity, 
pragmatism and quality [1]. The horizontal and flexible 
structure is articulated by a strategic planning reaching up 
to the 20025.  
It combines managerial approaches with experiences of the 
public sector. It is formed by super advisers and super 
managers that coordinate the works as regards human 
development, security and justice, equal opportunities, and 
renovation of government's institution, a general 
coordination, Czars (anticorruption and borders). Also, 
secretaries of State in government, social development, 
labor, companies and industrial development, agriculture 
and country property. 
On the other hand, the managers have declared [5] that 
they are convinced that the new government will be 
“friendlier”. They request options for the participation of 
the investment deprived in the energy sector (electricity 
and petrochemical secondary), they reject that it seeks to 
recapture populist politicians and they trust in that the 
relationship is of proximity but they will be critical when 
Fox makes a mistake. It is clear that Fox will govern to the 
Mexican State with a focus on the New Public 
Management, as if it were the corporation “Mexico, CORP.  
that puts to it finishes off the petrochemical one and the 
electric sector to the globalized transnational capitals.  
Fox'a approach is frank and pragmatic. Madero qualifies 
Fox like “pragmatic, a man willing to throw ropes, to say 
big words, to buy votes, everything with such of winning 
the elections…fall in the pragmatism, and I worry about 
that for him is more important that pragmatic principle that 
the democratic principle…should have to see until where a 
government panista with Fox ‘would be willing to respect 
to the people of Mexico for opinions against those who are 
in the poder'…already in government could make the same 
thing, that is to eliminate those that are opposed…” [26]. 
Fox´s discourse is characterized by its open style and to 
break from the rigid protocol. Their frankness, 
businessman's style and their democratic genuineness, are 
points to their favor. Fox has the intention of making his 
government a dynamic promoter of development, vigilant 
on human rights and a pragmatic administrator of domestic 
policy (Churches, 2000). 
As a good manager, its pragmatism to solve problems is its 
main asset to achieve the “agreement” to the one that 
aspires among all the sectors of the society. But also its 
weak point in the negotiations: it tries to sum up 
“minimum points of outburst” where all the political actors 
put on of agreement, simultaneously, in the economic and 
political matters. The proposals will be able to be 
questioned by a civil society and the legislative power in 
which a majority doesn't exist for some of the political 
parties. It will be easier than to achieve the cohabitation, to 
build the necessary consent before the lack of absolute 
control of a Congress that won't be unconditional. Fox has 
said in this respect “my government won't make decisions, 
overalls in economic matter that attempt against the 
interests of the majorities. Anything will be made without 
consent and much less to backs of the will of the 
Mexicans” (Macroeconomics, 2000). In this sense, there is 
consent among the diverse political forces to delimit the 
presidential power by means of the suppression of meta 
constitutionals abilities and the creation of the civil service 
of independent career to the executive's will.  
But the pragmatism of Fox doesn't have ideological base. 
It cannot be expected the postulation of liberal values but a 
necessary escape of the cage priista, as it sentences Reyes 
Heroles [22]. Fox has declared that its government won't 
be of bitterness and it demonstrated moving away the 
demand interposed against who accused him of receiving 
the foreigner's money confirming certain rumors that 
partly came of the former president Salinas de Gortari 
(Hills M., 2000b).  
The managerialism focus of the State considers the 
citizens as clients to who it is necessary to satisfy with 
services of total quality. The president exchanges the word 
client for that of citizen, with a vision in the one that for 
example, it is inappropriate to promote policies of 
indigenous community development. Disrespectfully, Fox 
has offered the indigenous people “vocho, changarro and 
tele” as answer to centuries of rebellions against the 
capitalist system for the injustices made against them. To 
the neoliberalism centered in the forces of the market, the 
natives are not consumers.  
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Therefore, they are disposable and in the best of the cases 
a population to integrate or to assimilate in the lowest 
layers in a work force without rights and subordinate them 
to the capital, as the proposal to train them to be “the 
foreigners' gardeners” made by Fox in campaign. The 
political analysts coincide in that “his proposals have been 
contradictory, sometimes retrograde, sometimes hopeful, 
but they still lack the coherence that would have a 
complete program, we would have to be critical before a 
possible new liberal version with some attenuation” [20]. 
This way, the fractions integrated to the directing elite are 
recomposed with the managers to guarantee the continuity 
of the economic model, the dimensioning of a functional 
democracy these mates with the discipline of the market 
and the structural reinvention of the system. This allows a 
bigger reproduction of the capital and the deepening of the 
dominance instruments to mark more the differences and 
social injustices. But this democracy favored by an 
authoritarian system of free market is an hegemonic 
ideology of the elite of the transnational globalized 
capitalism that imposes the decisions in its own benefit. 
However, the real power remains under the same control 
of the transnational capitalist interests. 
On the other hand, the PAN in the government will have to 
confront the waste of the President's figure like ruler. 
There are evidences that the style of governing of Fox will 
be less flexible in political and more authoritarian in 
economic politics that the previous presidents, although he 
affirms that are priorities the attention to the poor. Under 
this new different correlation of forces and with the same 
rules of separation of powers that establish their autonomy, 
the public matters are managed in more transparent form.  
The frauds to the public sector and the violence to the 
conflicts now have a treatment more attached to the Rule 
of the State and the citizenship can demand the right to the 
rendition of bills and the transparency. Establishing the 
material conditions for law and order will be one of the 
government's challenges. 
The organization of the new political system will condition 
the economic politics. According to the analysis of 
Bendesky [6] the macroeconomic peak of the country in 
that Fox receives and that it has been prolonged for more 
than four years “it is sustained by factors of the situation 
hidden in the macroeconomic bills as the high price of the 
petroleum, the entrance of foreign currencies that has 
reduced the dollar, and the dynamics of the economy of 
United States…can change its tendency and to make pay 
the costs to the whole Mexican society when it is in course 
the government of Fox.. Among them it would be an 
adjustment of the exchange rate, increase in the inflation, 
bigger external imbalance and inability to solve the topic 
of the poverty.” So the challenge is to maintain the 
economic stability, to increase the economic growth and to 
support the competitiveness and to increase the 
productivity of the economic agents.  
The political transition will come harnessed to an 
economic reformation but there won't be a social advance. 
Structural economic reforms needed to modernizing the 
regulatory framework for general economic activity and 
the strengthening the functional structure of the financial 
system. Clip to the social expense in the education items 
and public health to lose weight the bureaucracy gradually 
by means of the transfer of these functions from the State 
to the private sector. Fox has said that will reduce 
government's cost, subjecting to a rigorous but gradual diet 
to the federal public administration in next six years. 
Changes to eliminate the padlock from 51% to the national 
investment to give bigger opening to the private 
investment and foreigner and the invigoration of the 
financial system. 
Fox’s government will be committed to an integral fiscal 
reform and to fiscal tightening disciplines. However, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) it recommended to 
maintain a “wise fiscal politics to assure the continuity of 
their favorable growth and to avoid the risk of a 
overheating in their economy”, [21]. A fiscal reformation 
that eroded the principle of solidarity, base of the federal 
pact that assists to the inequalities of regional development, 
sustains of the national development. 
 
Privatizations and opening to the competition of the 
energy sector, especially to the electric and petrochemical 
industry, so that according to the same managers, “the 
country functions well…the entrepreneurs don't want to 
buy Pemex or CFE. As private sector what we want is that 
they allow us to compete, to participate in certain 
environments of these productive branches, to make them 
competitive at the international level…there is not 
necessary to put padlocks to the foreign investment so that 
it intrudes in the electricity and hydrocarbons. The only 
rules for the national capitals and foreigners should be a 
market economy, commercial opening and prices fixed by 
the international competition” [5]. 
 
Amendments to Article Third of the Constitution to 
introduce the freedom of the teaching and with it the 
possibility to give the opportunity to the religious 
education in the schools. An streamlining labor legislation 
is also needed, to reform to article 123 to introduce a New 
Federal Law of the Work less protective of the rights of 
the workers, etc. To generate more employments and 
better wages, they are some of the new government's 
proposals. In sum, the deepening of the model of free 
market. 
 
Under a focus of the New Public Management, the 
government of Fox intends to deepen in the 
decentralization of the decisions by means of the 
invigoration of federalism, a federalism post - PRI to 
transfer the state governments the resources, abilities and 
responsibilities. In economic matter, this accumulation of 
resources, abilities and decisions gave place to what Zaid 
denominated “the Presidential Economy.” The 
restructuring project and the federal government's 
reengineering are guided with an efficiency approach to 
the gradual weigh loss of the bureaucracy in order to 
optimize the resources and to reduce the costs of their 
operation. 
 
The project of the government of Fox is located in 8 
strategic areas. These are restructuring of the Secretary of 
José G. Vargas 
The First International on Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 19-21, 2001. 
Government, modifications in the procurement of justice 
and public security, redefinition of functions of the 
controlling public expense. Also, modernization and 
reformations to the energy industry (petroleum and 
electricity), redefinition of social development objectives, 
continuity of the economic project and reactivation of the 
foreign policy [7]. In general terms the neoliberal 
economic policy prevalent is not rectified in the last 18 
years, but rather a depeening of the same one. However, 
their project of restructuring of the federal public 
administration assures that “none of the current public 
servants will be left in the street without employment 
opportunities” [8]. 
 
The Reformation of the State, the decentralization of the 
functions and the reorganization of the government 
bureaucracy are inevitable to improve the democratization, 
governance, public administration and to impose the rule 
of law for the legality and justice. The challenge to 
organize the government consists on structuring a system 
of multi sector matrix management of public 
administration [4]. This can be done with a double purpose: 
to coordinate the sector’s actions and to distribute in the 
structures of the local governments, attributions and 
abilities. Both have as purpose the reestablishment of the 
solidarity and the social cohesion and that they are also 
inclusive of the excluded social sectors of the benefits of 
the development. 
 
The new government's main challenge will be the one of 
building new institutional structures that solve the 
problems of the new reality that it faces the managerial 
group in the power. As for example, those institutions that 
impede the monopoly practices and that they sustain the 
governance of the Mexican society. This governance 
should be considered as a democratic mechanism that 
facilitates the relationships with the public powers in the 
processes of making decisions for the formulation and 
implementation of public relationships, and to establish a 
harmonious relationship among the three powers. In 
political matter, it highlights to consolidate the maturity of 
the electoral democratic processes, to achieve the political 
reconciliation among the diverse political forces, to foment 
the political and ideological plurality in the organs of the 
State, to impel the processes of decentralization, 
federalism and regional and municipal development. 
 
The new institutions that emerge of the government's 
decentralized reorganization should be guided to satisfy 
the demands of the citizenship opening channels for social 
participation. Also, to enlarge the democracy by means of 
the recognition of its territorial environment and have 
structures characteristic of public organization. The direct 
election of the representatives, the assignment of abilities 
to the municipal government, the coercion capacity, the 
readiness of not labeled resources and the direct 
administration of local services.   
 
With a weak fiscal structure, the financing of the basic 
functions of the State won't be possible. Other functions of 
the State will be transferred to the civil society and the 
market. The social expense will have a maneuver margin 
limited to support the social politics as regards education, 
health, public security and infrastructure. A public, lay, 
gratuitous education and based on the values and the 
quality, it will be the social politics’ axis. Fox will have 
programs and mechanisms that reduce the poverty to settle 
down and achieve a fair distribution of the income, recover 
the real income and it is translated in benefits to the 
families, by means of the generation of employment 
opportunities, financing sources, training, etc., for all. 
Philanthropic societies and the Catholic church will take 
charge of to develop some of the functions before 
commended to the welfare State, when the separation in 
fact existed between the Church and the State, such as the 
social attendance to the excluded groups and excluded. 
  
The proposal of the democratic capitalist model for the 
economies of market in Latin American countries needs to 
be revised in function of the results expressed in increment 
of the poverty. To recover the credibility in the 
government and its genuineness are some of the main 
challenges that has the next administration of Fox. The 
same as to reduce the high index of poverty by means of 
the creation of a million two hundred thousand new 
employment per year, to maintain the economic growth 
and the economic development. The correction of the 
social inequalities is required starting from the economic 
politics’ reorientation. To approach political public that 
combats the inequality as regards education, of health and 
infrastructure and of housing, it is an inevitable topic 
  
It is required a governing and rectifying action of the State 
to correct the inequalities, an economy that is social, a 
human economy, a humanistic politics in the economic 
sense with a high emphasis in the combat to the inequality. 
The economic politics should be guided to generate 
conditions of human life and only not to change the bias 
that gives to the market an indisputable hegemony and to 
guide certainly on productive bases, but to make 
responsible to the State from the combat to such 
inequalities. The economic politics has to become unified 
to reduce the poverty with measure proposals as the 
establishment of the Social Banking to support family and 
associative companies, as well as the creation of a pact 
salary government - employer - worker that allows 
recovering the purchasing power of the workers. 
 
A political system is required that it reveals the public 
administration and it is frequently accountable to people in 
such a way that allows the rulers to be more near to their 
governed and open up to the social participation the design 
and the implementation of the public politicians. However, 
the conservative speech panista and managerial it only 
recognizes the social participation of non-governmental 
organizations of private attendance with philanthropic 
ends. Nevertheless that in this joint of party alternation in  
power, the civil society that had always maintained a 
conflicting relationship with a government that looked for 
its corporate control, now has the opportunity to 
participate in the design of the project of the country under 
a new relationship with the government. 
 
However, a strong concern exists because certain threat 
signs and danger have been presented in the state 
governments of extraction panista, like in the cases of 
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Jalisco, Chihuahua and New León. The governments 
panistas in these States have left negative antecedents of 
repression to critical civil organizations related with the 
defense of the human rights, labor, political and civic, and 
a lack of institutional answer before situations of violence 
when commitments were looked for. This print makes 
suppose the existence of a lowering profile of the 
government of Fox.  
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